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CIVILIAN SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVISTS IN 
THE ARAB SPRING AND BEYOND: CAN 
THEY EVER LOSE THEIR CIVILIAN 
PROTECTIONS? 
INTRODUCTION 
he Arab Spring has brought great change to the Middle 
East. While a series of protests and violent revolutions 
supplanted old regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, 
Bahrain was rocked by protests and a civil war still rages in 
Syria.1 New communications technologies such as Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter, as well as the global proliferation of cell 
phones, have been perceived as indispensable tools to organize 
protests,2 galvanize public support,3 incite armed rebellion, and 
seek the support of allies and the international community.4 
Dissidents’ use of modern social media technology for these 
purposes can pose a real threat to an established regime, so 
much so that the military will try to stop these activities 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Interview by Celeste Headlee with Abderrahim Foukara, Washington 
Bureau Chief, Al Jazeera Int’l, & Maren Turner, Executive Director, Freedom 
Now, in Washington D.C. (Oct. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.npr.org/2012/10/02/162154681/syria-bahrain-still-feel-arab-
spring-aftershocks. 
 2. Thomas Sander, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’s role in Arab Spring 
(Middle East Uprisings), SOCIAL CAPITAL BLOG (May 23, 2012), 
http://socialcapital.wordpress.com/2011/01/26/twitter-facebook-and-youtubes-
role-in-tunisia-uprising/. 
 3. Though there were several previous self-immolations in Tunisia, Ryan 
asserts that the use of social media to spread video of the event is what 
caused the incident to garner attention from the wider Tunisian public and 
the traditional media. Yasmine Ryan, How Tunisia’s Revolution Began, AL 
JAZEERA (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.ht
ml. 
 4. See Richard A. Lindsey, What the Arab Spring Tells Us About the Fu-
ture of Social Media in Revolutionary Movements, SMALL WARS J. (Jul. 2013), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-the-arab-spring-tells-us-about-the-
future-of-social-media-in-revolutionary-movement. Fitzpatrick notes that 
social media can be used to garner support from international partners. See 
Alex Fitzpatrick, Social Media Becoming Online Battlefield in Syria, 
MASHABLE (Aug. 9, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/08/09/social-media-syria. 
T
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through cyberwarfare5 or direct action against the dissidents 
using such social media technology.6 
A dissident’s use of social media presents great potential to 
alter the military balance of an engagement, as it can be used 
to directly or indirectly recruit fighters and encourage military 
defections.7 Dissidents could also use social media to document 
abusive actions by the regime,8 express political views or aspi-
rations incompatible with those of the regime, garner sympa-
thy and material support from the international community, or 
otherwise aid a military or political victory over the regime.9 
These activities, while potentially harmful to the regime’s mili-
tary and civilian government, could be characterized as free 
expression, an attempt to alter only the political situation,10 or 
even journalism.11 In spite of such protections, a besieged re-
gime may wish to either silence social media activists or target 
them as though they were enemy military forces.12 
                                                                                                                                     
 5. Fitzpatrick, supra note 4. 
 6. Kristen McTighe, A Blogger at Arab Spring’s Genesis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
12, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/world/africa/a-
blogger-at-arab-springs-genesis.html?_r=0. 
 7. Social media, such as YouTube, could be used for this purpose. Howev-
er, more traditional radio devices were actually used for this purpose in doc-
umented reports. This article documents members of the armed opposition 
encouraging defection, but this activity could just as easily be undertaken by 
civilians. See Erika Solomon & Douglas Hamilton, It’s a Walkie-Talkie War 
on Syrian Frequencies, REUTERS, April 4, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/04/us-syria-radio-
idUSBRE8330E420120404. 
 8. Jennifer Preston, Seeking to Disrupt Protestors, Syria Cracks Down on 
Social Media, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2011, at A10. 
 9. SEAN ADAY, ET. AL., BLOGS AND BULLETS II: NEW MEDIA CONFLICT AFTER 
THE ARAB SPRING 20–22 (2012), available at 
http://www.usip.org/publications/blogs-and-bullets-ii-new-media-and-conflict-
after-the-arab-spring (detailing how outside political or military pressure 
may make victory for the opposition more likely). 
 10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 19, 25, Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I) art. 79, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). 
 12. This can be accomplished by manipulating the content of the post, dis-
crediting it, or blocking it. Fitzpatrick, supra note 4; Christopher Williams, 
How Egypt Shut Down the Internet, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 28, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8288
163/How-Egypt-shut-down-the-internet.html. 
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Under international law, a regime can only target civilians 
with military force if the civilian has surrendered his or her 
protections by “taking direct part in hostilities.”13 Although it 
seems that many regimes have and will continue to use their 
military, paramilitary, and other state organs to target civil-
ians regardless of international law,14 a regime has the right to 
repel an insurrection and defend itself against combatants or 
civilians who have truly lost protection by aiding combatants.15 
This was demonstrated in Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi’s 
orders to attack armed civilians were within his regime’s right 
of self-defense, but orders to attack civilian protestors were 
contrary to international law.16 In order to balance the rights of 
the regime to properly defend itself and the rights of a civilian 
to lawfully express him or herself, it is imperative to define the 
line between a social media activist who has lost civilian pro-
tection and one who has not.17 
Two competing approaches have developed to determine 
when a civilian has lost their protection from military targeting 
by “taking direct part in hostilities.”18 The first is the Protocol I 
Test, developed by the International Committee of the Red 
                                                                                                                                     
 13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), supra note 11, art. 51, sec. 3. 
   14. See Libya: 10 Protestors Apparently Executed, ALERTNET: A THOMSON 
REUTERS FOUND. SERVICE (Aug. 19, 2011, 12:30 AM), 
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/libya-10-protesters-apparently-executed. 
 15. Sarah Joseph, Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, CASTAN CENTER 
FOR HUM. RTS. L. (Mar. 18, 2011), 
http://castancentre.com/2011/03/18/humanitarian-intervention-in-libya. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Keck articulates the idea that international law seeks to strike a bal-
ance between military necessity and ensuring humanitarian protections. A 
state’s right to self-defense, which gives rise to military necessity, must be 
based on permissible goals, however. Trevor Keck, Not All Civilians are Cre-
ated Equal: The Principle of Distinction, the Question of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities, and Evolving Restraints on the use of Force in Warfare, 211 Mil. 
L. Rev. 115, 131 (Spring 2012); The International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights contains the right to freedom of expression, though it notes that 
freedom may be curtailed only to the narrowest extent possible for national 
security and public order needs. International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supra note 10, art. 19. 
 18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), supra note 11, art. 51, sec. 3; Douglas Moore, Twenty-First Century 
Embedded Journalists: Lawful Targets?, ARMY LAW., July 2009, at 18–21. 
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Cross (“ICRC”).19 This Test requires that the civilian act to 
cause military harm through an action designed for the pur-
pose of causing such harm.20 The civilian’s actions and the 
harm must also be linked directly within a single causal step.21 
The second approach, the Functionality Test, evaluates the ci-
vilian based on the military importance of the civilian’s func-
tion to the faction that the civilian is supporting.22 
This Note will argue that neither the Protocol I Test nor the 
Functionality Test adequately balance a social media activist’s 
right to free expression with a regime’s right to self-defense,23 
in light of the potential military advantages gained by using 
social media.24 An ideal balance will allow the social media ac-
tivist unlimited political expression, even if the regime is exis-
tentially threatened by it, while respecting the regime’s right to 
target an activist who specifically endeavors to inflict serious 
military harm. The social media activist is less likely to be pro-
tected under the more expansive Functionality Test, because 
this test fails to assure adequate protections for the activist’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 19. See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notions of Direct Partici-
pation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: Adopted by the 
Assembly of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 26 February, 
2009, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991 (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE]. 
 20. Id. at 1025. 
 21. Id. at 996. 
 22. Dan Stigall, The Thickest Grey: Assessing the Status of the Civilian 
Response Corps Under the Law of International Armed Conflict and the U.S. 
Approach to the Targeting of Civilians, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 885, 896 (2010). 
 23. The United Nations Charter guarantees the right to national self-
defense. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 24. Zambelis notes the military value of social media by writing that the 
“FSA [Free Syrian Army] appears keen to compensate for its tactical and op-
erational inadequacies by exploiting social media as a force multiplier.” Chris 
Zambelis, Information Wars: Assessing the Social Media Battlefield in Syria, 
COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER SENTINEL, Jul. 2012, at 19, 20, available at 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/information-wars-assessing-the-social-media-
battlefield-in-syria. The United States military uses information to degrade 
an adversary military’s efficiency and as a standalone “nonlethal capability.” 
These goals would seem to lend themselves to the employment of social me-
dia. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.30, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
1-1 to 1-4 (Apr. 2005); PRENTISS BAKER, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WITHIN 
THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN (2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519576 (submitted to the faculty of Air War College). 
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right to freedom of speech and association.25 The Protocol I Test 
is much more likely to grant protection to a social media activ-
ist, but it almost universally prevents the regime from defend-
ing itself against the military harm that social media activists 
can purposefully cause.26 
This Note will then argue that the Functionality Test can be 
adapted to adequately balance the rights of the regime with 
those of the social media activists.27 The Functionality Test re-
quires additional safeguards to ensure that regimes only target 
social media activists in those rare instances where the activ-
ists intentionally pose a legitimate military threat.28 These ad-
ditional safeguards will require that the activist exhibit an in-
dividual, subjective intent to cause military harm to the re-
gime,29 and that the act not constitute part of the “general war 
effort” by merely building military capacity.30 
Part I of this Note will provide a background of civilian par-
ticipation in conflict and the use of social media, both before 
and during the Arab Spring, by examining the dissidents’ ac-
tions and the regimes’ reactions. This examination will focus 
heavily on the situation in Syria, as its civil war is the closest 
                                                                                                                                     
 25. Stigall notes that the Functionality Test is more likely to allow for the 
targeting of civilians. Stigall, supra note 22, at 896. Free expression and polit-
ical harm should not result in the loss of civilian protection. INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020. 
 26. Michael Schmitt criticizes the Protocol I Approach as constraining a 
military’s ability to respond to certain legitimate threats posed by civilians. 
Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 725, 729 (2010) [here-
inafter Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities]. 
 27. International law generally recognizes the right to free expression, 
association, and political views. International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supra note 10, art. 19. The right of a regime to protect itself in a legal 
manner is not affected by the general character of the regime. Joseph, supra 
note 15. However, doctrines like humanitarian intervention may be used to 
address abuses in the conduct of the war or the government’s behavior in 
general. See T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in 
Light of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
 28. Stigall notes that the Functionality Test could be interpreted in a 
manner too expansive to constrain military action against civilians that 
should be protected from targeting. He also observes that the Functionality 
Test is more likely to allow targeting of civilians than other interpretations. 
See Stigall, supra note 22, at 896–898. 
 29. Free expression and political harm should not result in the loss of civil-
ian protection. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020. 
 30. Id. 
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to a traditional intrastate armed conflict, 31 and dissidents us-
ing social media in such a conflict are more likely to cause mili-
tary harm. Part II will address the current provisions and in-
terpretations of international law that result in civilian dissi-
dents who use social media, either losing or maintaining their 
protection from targeting. Part III will analyze and evaluate 
the different applications of social media activities that may 
result in the loss of civilian protection in light of the different 
interpretations of a civilian’s direct participation in hostili-
ties.32 Part IV will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of 
each interpretation of direct participation and propose addi-
tional criteria for determining when a social media activist has 
lost his or her civilian protection. These additional criteria will 
seek to balance a regime’s right to defend itself from what 
could be employed as a new type of military threat against the 
legitimate rights of a social media activist.33 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Evolution of Protection for Civilians 
The right of the civilian population to be free from military 
targeting has been evolving over the last 150 years.34 Following 
the widespread civilian suffering of World War II,35 large seg-
ments of the international community drafted the final treaty 
in the modern series of the Geneva Conventions to protect civil-
ians, in addition to the soldiers, sailors, and prisoners of war 
protected under previous Geneva Conventions, from certain 
                                                                                                                                     
 31. The conflict in Syria most closely resembles a traditional intrastate 
conflict because the regime forces are engaged with several organized, armed 
opposition groups and coalitions of such organized groups. See, Lina Sinjab, 
Syria Crisis: Guide to Armed and Political Opposition, BBC (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24403003. 
 32. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), supra note 11, art. 51, sec. 3. 
 33. The United Nations Charter guarantees the right to national self-
defense. U.N. Charter art. 51; Joseph, supra note 15. 
 34. Protection of civilians was at first customary and began to be codified 
by instruments such as the Hague Conventions of 1907. See Waldemar Solf, 
Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary In-
ternational Law and Under Protocol I, 1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 117, 120–
24 (1986). 
 35. Keck, supra note 17, at 120–121. 
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instances of undue harm during war.36 Within international 
conflicts, states were obliged to offer certain protections to op-
posing armed forces, military objectives, and civilians actively 
participating in hostilities.37 These included protections from 
murder, summary execution, use as a hostage, torture, and 
other inhumane treatments.38 The first and second additional 
protocols to the Geneva Conventions explicitly protected civil-
ians from military targeting, as long as they refrained from 
participation in hostilities.39 The first additional protocol ex-
tended some of the Geneva Conventions protections to intra-
state conflicts for the first time, though only within the context 
of conflicts against colonial or apartheid regimes.40 The first 
additional protocol conditioned civilian protection on direct, ra-
                                                                                                                                     
 36. The protection of civilians was codified by the fourth treaty in the Ge-
neva Conventions and was similar to the safeguards offered to the groups 
shielded by the three previous treaties. For this reason, the enumerated pro-
tections are referred to as “Common Article 3” for their identical placement in 
each treaty. Lori Hosni, The ABCs of the Geneva Conventions and their Ap-
plicability to Modern Warfare, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 137–138 
(2007); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 37. Hosni, supra note 36, at 137–38 (citing Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
supra note 36, art. 3). 
 38. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 37, art. 3; Gene-
va Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 37, art. 3; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 37, art. 
3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, supra note 36, art. 3. 
 39. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), supra note 11, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. 
 40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
supra note 39, art. 1, ¶ 4; Hosni, supra note 36, at 143–45. 
1214 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:3 
ther than active participation in the conflict, as had previously 
been the case.41 A second additional protocol extended the civil-
ian protections of the first additional protocol to all internal 
armed conflicts.42 
B. Increasing Participation of Civilians in Warfare. 
Concurrent with the development of greater civilian protec-
tions,43 civilians have become generally more involved in war-
fare, both as victims and as participants.44 The recent prolifera-
tion of intrastate conflicts45 has been accompanied by the in-
creased suffering of civilians in such conflicts.46 The nature of 
these conflicts seems to create a propensity for greater civilian 
involvement in the fighting.47 This increased civilian involve-
ment is likely due to the intermingling of regime forces, opposi-
tion forces, and civilians in close quarters and the greater like-
                                                                                                                                     
 41. The treaty protections for civilians in intrastate conflicts were original-
ly allowed for groups attempting to overthrow a colonial regime, occupation 
from a foreign power, or an apartheid regime. Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art. 1, sec. 4. Later, all internal 
armed conflicts were covered. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra note 39, art. 1; Michael Schmitt, Direct 
Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict, in FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR DIETER FLECK 505, 507, (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter 21st 
Century Armed Conflict], available at 
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/humanrights/HUMR5503/h09/undervisn
ingsmateriale/schmitt_direct_participation_in_hostilties.pdf. 
 42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, supra note 
39, art. 1. 
 43. See Solf, supra note 34, at 117–129. 
 44. See generally Andreas Wegner & Simon J. A. Mason. The Civilianiza-
tion of Armed Conflict: Trends and Implications, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 835 
(2008). 
 45. See generally Stephane Dosse, The Intrastate Wars, SMALL WARS J., 2 
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-rise-of-intrastate-
wars. 
 46. The majority of the worst instances of civilian suffering are a result of 
intrastate conflicts. OXFAM, PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN 2010: FACTS, FIGURES, 
AND THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL’S RESPONSE, 2–3 (2011), available at 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/protection-of-civilians-in-
2010-09052011-en.pdf. 
 47. See Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 840–41, 843–46. 
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lihood that civilians will be invested in the outcome of a more 
local conflict.48 
At the same time, warfare in general is being waged with 
greater civilian involvement under the auspices of military su-
pervision.49 Contractors and civilians directly employed by the 
military are performing jobs that were once reserved for uni-
formed military personnel.50 Civilians often participate in con-
flicts through irregular militias51 or perform technical tasks for 
an organized military such as Cyber Operations,52 maintaining 
complex weapons systems,53 or preparing food for soldiers.54 
                                                                                                                                     
 48. Many factors may explain this increased civilian involvement in hostil-
ities. Intrastate conflicts may afford the opportunity for civilians to partici-
pate in an intrastate conflict as a pretext for other opportunities, such as per-
sonal gain or prosecution of a vendetta against a certain group. Furthermore, 
the parties to the conflict may have uncertain membership, with action un-
dertaken in a “bottom up” manner where civilians will broadly undertake the 
goals of a party on their own initiative. Id. at 843–44. 
 49. See generally Nathan E. Hill, Military Contractors–Too Much Depend-
ence? (Mar. 15, 2008) (Strategy Research Project for U.S. Army War College), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479000. 
 50. Civilians have become increasingly involved in administering and 
maintaining high technology military equipment such as command systems, 
communications, and sophisticated weapons. Wegner & Mason, supra note 
44, at 839 . Civilian contractors now routinely act as cooks, interpreters, se-
curity guards, and equipment maintenance workers. Mark Cancian, Contrac-
tors: the New Element of Military Force Structure, 38 UNITED STATES ARMY 
WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY: PARAMETERS 63–64 (Autumn 2008), available at 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/08autumn/
cancian.pdf. 
 51. For an example of this phenomenon, see Paul Rodgers, Syria: the 




 52. Cyber Operations include assuring security of computer networks as 
well as using such networks to offensively assist military commanders. Cyber 
Operations capabilities have been suggested as a tool of deterrence, similar to 
nuclear weapons, and have been used for other national security goals, such 
as sabotaging Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Zachary Fryer-Biggs, U.S. 
Cyber Moves Beyond Protection, DEFENSE NEWS (Mar. 16, 2014 9:54 AM), 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140316/DEFREG02/303170013/US-
Cyber-Moves-Beyond-Protection; DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CYBER OPERATIONS 
PERSONNEL REPORT 10-11, 14-15 (2011), available at 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=488076. 
 53. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 838–39. 
 54. Rod Nordman, Risks of Afghan War Shift from Soldiers to Contractors, 
N.Y. TIMES,  Feb. 12, 2012, at A1. 
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Militaries are also taking on other activities that were either 
formerly civilian in nature or did not exist in the recent past,55 
such as Cyber Operations, to safeguard and attack computer 
networks, and Information Operations, which are designed to 
impact a party’s ability to collect, process, disseminate, and act 
upon information.56 These developments have resulted in 
greater civilian involvement in military operations as well as 
the incorporation of arguably civilian activities into military 
operations.57 
The simultaneous trends of rising civilian involvement in in-
trastate conflicts and a generally increasing civilianization of 
military tasks58 have collided with the growing protections of-
fered to civilians during conflicts59 to cause even greater fric-
tion between legal protections and the reality of warfare.60 The 
use of social media can accelerate this friction, as its use may 
further muddle the difference between military goals, political 
goals, and free expression.61 
C. Use of Social Media in the Arab Spring. 
Social media has been perceived as instrumental to the polit-
ical and military effectiveness of the opposition and insurgent 
forces in the Arab Spring.62 The genesis of the Arab Spring 
                                                                                                                                     
 55. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 837–38. 
 56. Information Operations are activities designed to “affect the ability of 
the target audience . . . to collect, process, or disseminate information before 
or after decisions are made.” Information Operations include Psychological 
Operations which seek not only to affect other militaries, but also civilian 
populations and governments, which are necessary to achieve military goals. 
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13 INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS, II-3 to II-4 (2006) [hereinafter JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13]; Wegner 
& Mason, supra note 44, at 837–38; Fryer-Biggs, supra note 52. 
 57. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 837–38. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humani-
ty: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretative Guidance on the 
Notions of Direct Participations in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POl. 831, 
887 (2010) [hereinafter Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humani-
ty]. 
 60. Wegner & Mason, supra note 44, at 843–45. 
 61. Actors in the conflict are either political or military, but employ similar 
means to use social media in the Syrian conflict. Zambelis, supra note 24, at 
19. 
 62. See T.J. Waters, Social Media and the Arab Spring, SMALL WARS J. 
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/social-media-and-the-
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movement is thought to have occurred in Tunisia when Mo-
hamed Bouazizi immolated himself.63 He acted out of despera-
tion after he was unsuccessful in securing the return of his 
fruit and scale impounded by corrupt government officials.64 
This act is often cited as the catalyst that unleashed protests 
and rebellion across the region as the citizens of Tunisia, Libya, 
Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and other Arab countries yearned for 
“dignity, justice, and opportunity.”65 The ensuing protests and 
skirmishes with authorities were distributed throughout Tuni-
sia via Facebook, until traditional media picked up the story 
and further accelerated its distribution.66 News of the opposi-
tion’s activities and the regime’s repression were disseminated 
by the various means of social media; that dissemination, in 
turn, appears to have increased acts of protest against the re-
gime.67 Although paramilitary and police forces68 were used 
                                                                                                                                     
arab-spring. Some experts believe, however, that the impact of social media 
in the Arab Spring may have been overstated and that additional study is 
needed to draw definite conclusions about social media’s importance to these 
movements. See ADAY, ET. AL., supra note 9, at 3–5. 
 63. This event is often cited as the spark that ignited the events in Tuni-
sia, which in turn is cited as the immediate catalyst for the Arab Spring. 
Salman Shaikh, Mohamed Bouazizi: A Fruit Seller’s Legacy to the Arab Peo-
ple, CNN (Dec. 17, 2011, 9:23 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/16/world/meast/bouazizi-arab-spring-tunisia/; 
Ryan, supra note 3. 
 64. Hernando De Soto, The Real Mohamed Bouazizi, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 
16, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/16/the 
_real_mohamed_bouazizi. 
 65. Shaikh, supra note 63. 
 66. Social media is given great credit for spreading news of this event, as a 
similar event that was not widely reported failed to spark widespread civil 
action in Tunisia. Ryan, supra note 3. 
 67. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were used to spread news about the 
opposition’s and regime’s activities. These sources even fed information to 
traditional television news outlets. Ryan, supra note 3. 
 68. Customary practice indicates that police or paramilitary forces can be 
considered armed forces, thus their members are considered combatants, if 
they independently meet the criteria to be considered an armed force. It is 
arguable that this practice is confined to international conflicts, as it is not 
mentioned in Protocol II, which deals with a broader scope of intrastate con-
flicts than Protocol I, though examples given by the ICRC of activities, such 
as the enforcement of a nation’s laws, are not analogous to traditional mili-
tary action. International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 4: Definition of 
Armed Forces, CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule4 (last visited Oct. 25, 
2012); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
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against the protestors, the military itself seemed to act against 
the regime.69 This suggests the possibility that the use of social 
media may have served to recruit widespread military support 
for the revolution. It is entirely possible, however, that this 
movement was purely political, and the military simply de-
clined to intercede as the president had ordered.70 The usage of 
social media was aimed at organizing protests and disseminat-
ing information about the regime.71 These activities generally 
involved political mobilization against the government and 
lacked a military component.72 
During the conflict in Syria, the Free Syrian Army used so-
cial media to implore members of the regular Syrian military to 
defect and join the Free Syrian Army.73 The defections that fol-
                                                                                                                                     
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), supra note 11, art. 43. Membership in the armed forces, however, is a 
predicate to being considered a combatant—as distinguished from a civil-
ian—in international conflicts. International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Rule 3: Definition of Combatants, CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 
DATABASE, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule3 (last vis-
ited Sep. 14, 2012); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol I), supra note 11, art 43; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra note 39, art. 1. 
 69. Ellen Knickmeyer, Just Whose Side are Arab Armies on, Anyway?, 
FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/28/just_whose_side_are_arab_a
rmies_on_anyway. 
 70. The motivation for the military’s refusal to intercede and obey the 
President’s order to fire on the protestors is not clear. This refusal and the 
withdrawal of the military, however, have been described as “inexplicable.” 
See David Kirkpatrick, Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the 
Revolution’, NY TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at A4. 
 71. The use of social media in Tunisia closely mirrored the use of social 
media in Egypt. Sahar Kamus & Katherine Vaughn, Cyberactivism in the 
Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted 
the Balance, 14 ARAB MEDIA & SOC’Y, SUMMER 2011, available at 
http://www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article=769&printarticle. 
 72. See Knickmeyer, supra note 69. 
 73. YouTube and walkie-talkies were used by the opposition to try to in-
duce defection by regime soldiers. Solomon & Hamilton, supra note 7; Saad 
Abedine, Military Defectors Unite Under Free Syrian Army, CNN (Mar. 25, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/24/world/meast/syria-unrest. 
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lowed chronologically74 have allegedly filled the ranks of the 
Free Syrian Army while sapping the strength of the regular 
Syrian Army.75 Furthermore, the Free Syrian Army used the 
same social media to sow disunity and lower the morale of the 
Syrian military.76 This type of action has the effect of building 
up the military capacity of the Free Syrian Army while inflict-
ing military harm on the forces of the regime.77 
Social media activists used YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and 
a host of other media to broadcast atrocities and other abuses 
by the regime to the outside world.78 In Libya, social media us-
ers publicized violence by the regime, which was cited as a sig-
nificant factor in galvanizing support for international military 
intervention.79 Posting evidence of such violence can bridge the 
gap between what happened on the ground during an armed 
conflict and what the governments and citizens of the world 
know when traditional international media is unable to docu-
ment such violence through local reporting.80 In many instanc-
es, such international awareness galvanized the citizens of oth-
er countries to encourage their own governments to politically 
pressure the regime committing the violence.81 Measures un-
                                                                                                                                     
 74. The connection between media inducement and actual defection can be 
inferred, but not documented. See generally Abedine, supra note 73; See Sol-
omon & Hamilton, supra note 7. 
 75. Inside the Free Syrian Army, PBS NEWS HOUR (March 12, 2012), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june12/syria_03-12.html. 
 76. Zambelis, supra note 24, at 20. 
 77. The composition of the Free Syrian Army itself implies that defection 
causes harm to regime forces as well as benefit to opposition forces. See In-
side the Free Syrian Army, supra note 75; But, Zambelis characterizes the use 
of social media to encourage defections from the regime to the opposition as 
more important to reducing the morale and effectiveness of the regime than 
the marginal shift in relative personnel strength. See Zambelis, supra note 
24, at 20–21. 
 78. Libya: 10 Protestors Apparently Executed, supra note 14. 
 79. Aday writes that the use of social media in Libya generated a great 
deal of discussion of the conflict. He is currently investigating how much, if at 
all, such discussion can influence a foreign government to intervene. See Sean 
Aday, Social Media, Diplomacy, and the Responsibility to Protect, TAKE FIVE 
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://takefiveblog.org/2012/10/17/social-media-diplomacy-
and-the-responsibility-to-protect. 
 80. ADAY, ET. AL., supra note 9. 
 81. This “boomerang” phenomenon is when a population oppressed by a 
regime causes citizens of another country to compel their own government to 
pressure the regime. This political pressure may cause the regime to suspend 
abuses or make it more difficult to commit them. ADAY, ET. AL., supra note 9 
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dertaken by other governments to compel the regime to halt 
violence sometimes result in subsequent military interven-
tion.82 
Dissidents’ use of social media during the Arab Spring has 
shown that some uses of social media are capable of altering 
the military landscape in addition to causing widespread politi-
cal consequences.83 The recent uprisings of the Arab Spring al-
so suggest several plausible scenarios in which social media 
could be employed in future political and military uprisings, 
such as organizing protests to distract the regime’s military 
while opposition forces attack.84 Each of these scenarios has 
different military and political consequences, and will therefore 
inform a different legal result as to when the social media ac-
tivist in question would lose his or her civilian protection.85 
II. APPROACHES TO CIVILIAN PROTECTION 
Under the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocols I and II, 
protecting civilians in interstate and intrastate conflicts re-
spectively,86 a civilian loses his or her protections from military 
                                                                                                                                     
(citing MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 
(1998)). 
 82. See The Colonel Charges Ahead, ECONOMIST (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18400592. 
 83. See Zambelis, supra note 24 
 84. See generally Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’s role in Arab Spring 
(Middle East Uprisings), supra note 2. 
 85. Stigall notes that the interpretative framework chosen will lead to dif-
ferent results in situations with the same facts. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 
907–08. 
 86. Civilian status is asserted simply by finding that the person is not a 
member of the armed forces or a comparable opposition group in an armed 
conflict. The most important factor in determining membership in the armed 
forces is that the person is under the discipline of a responsible command. 
The Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols are, however, unclear 
about whether protections afforded to combatants extend to dissident armed 
forces in an intrastate conflict. The ICRC states that the definition of armed 
forces may be used to distinguish combatants from civilians for the purposes 
of determining civilian status in an intrastate conflict. International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, Rule 3: Definition of Combatants, supra note 68; Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 4: Definition of Armed Forces, 
supra note 68; International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 5: Definition 
of Civilians, CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule5 (last visited Sep. 15, 
2012). Both additional protocols contain the same protections for civilians not 
taking direct part in hostilities but apply to different types of conflicts. The 
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targeting only by taking “direct part in hostilities.”87 There are 
two primary interpretations of this standard which would allow 
varying degrees of participation and support to an armed con-
flict before the civilian would lose his or her status.88 The Pro-
tocol I Test evaluates three formal elements of the civilian’s 
actions in a manner that tends to conservatively preserve civil-
ian protections89 whereas the more expansive Functionality 
Test evaluates a civilian based on their military value.90 
                                                                                                                                     
first protocol applies to international conflicts and a limited set of intrastate 
conflicts while the second protocol applies generally to intrastate conflicts. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
supra note 11, art. 1, sec 4, art. 51, sec. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra note 39, art. 1, sec. 2, art. 
13. 
 87. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
supra note 39, art. 13, sec. 3. A temporal element must also be considered in 
order to understand the requirement of direct participation in hostilities. 
Many scholars believe that protection is lost only for the duration of such 
participation as opposed to the idea that habitual participation will result in 
a long term, total loss of protection. Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost, Or-
ganized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” In-
terpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 660–62 (2010). 
 88. Moore, supra note 18, at 20–21. The Geographic, Functional, and Tem-
poral Test is a third alternative test to determine direct participation in hos-
tilities. This test considers “(1) geographic proximity of service provided to 
units in contact with the enemy, (2) proximity of relationship between ser-
vices provided and harm resulting to enemy, and (3) temporal relation of 
support to enemy contact or harm resulting to enemy.” Albert S. Janin, En-
gaging Civilian-Belligerents Leads to Self-Defense/Protocol I Marriage, ARMY 
LAW., July 2007, at 89 (quoting INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, INT’L & OPERATIONAL 
LAW VOL. II, at I-10 (2006)). Stigall finds the Geographic, Functional, and 
Temporal Test less expansive than the Functionality Test. Stigall, supra note 
22, at 896. It should be noted that some believe the Functionality Test to also 
consider the geographic and temporal proximity of military harm. Moore, 
supra note 18, at 21 n. 215. 
 89. The International Committee of the Red Cross developed this interpre-
tation because prior national guidance and adjudications on the subject did 
not establish an applicable rule, but rather lists of behaviors, beyond physi-
cally fighting an enemy, that were classified as either direct or indirect par-
ticipation. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 991–93; Decon-
structing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 705–08, 725, 
729. 
 90. Moore, supra note 18, at 19–22; Stigall, supra note 22, at 896. 
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A. Protocol I Test 
The Protocol I Test was developed by the ICRC to clarify the 
ambiguity of the “direct participation” requirement articulated 
in the Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols.91 The 
Protocol I Test requires three elements to find direct participa-
tion in hostilities under the Geneva Conventions.92 
First, a “threshold of harm” must be reached wherein an act 
is “likely to adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict” or an act that kills or 
causes physical harm to a person or object protected from at-
tack.93 This includes any harm, or potential harm, that may 
have a negative effect on the military situation.94 Such harm is 
broadly defined and only needs to deprive the regime of some 
military advantage or diminish its military capabilities.95 The 
threshold of harm does not account for actual severity of harm, 
so long as some harm occurs or is likely to occur.96 
Second, there must be a direct causal relationship between 
the act and the harm suffered.97 The ICRC recommends consid-
ering several factors to parse direct causation from indirect 
causation.98 First, in order to constitute direct causation, the 
act must not be a part of the general war effort.99 This distin-
guishes those acts that indirectly support hostilities through 
the general war effort, to include “war sustaining activities like 
                                                                                                                                     
    91. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 991–94; Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), supra note 39, art. 13, sec. 
3. 
 92. Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity, supra note 59, 
at 856–57. 
 93. The harm does not have to actually come to fruition but must only be a 
likely result. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1016. 
 94. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, 714-
15. 
 95. The breadth of activity meeting this element is intentionally wide. It 
was thought that the remaining elements would properly exclude indirect 
participation. Still, “political, economic, and other advantages, such as im-
pacting civilian morale” are not military harm though they may be indispen-
sable to a war effort. Id. at 715–20. 
 96. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1017. 
 97. Id. at 1020. 
 98. Michael Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Partici-
pation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 26–27 (2010) 
[hereinafter A Critical Analysis]. 
 99. Stigall, supra note 22, at 894. 
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manufacturing ammunition,” from those that actually apply 
military force, like assaulting an enemy position.100 Activities 
within the general war effort are those that build the general 
military capacity and contribute to military victory by support-
ing and enabling the general capability to apply military 
force.101 These include military production, maintenance of 
transportation infrastructure, finance, and activities building 
political support for the conflict.102 The causation element is, 
however, broader than simply separating participation in the 
general war effort from actions with more specific military con-
sequences.103 This element also requires that no more than a 
single “causal step” exist between the action constituting direct 
participation and the harm inflicted.104 For instance, building 
                                                                                                                                     
 100. This idea tries to parse military logistics, industrial research, and oth-
er support into that which is part of a traditional war economy from support 
tied to specific military operations which, while similar, shares a closer caus-
al connection to the specific military harm in question. The ICRC actually 
defines the general war effort as activities “objectively contributing to the 
defeat of the adversary . . . beyond the actual conduct of hostilities.” This, 
along with the argument that the line delineating direct participation should 
fall somewhere between an individual engaged in combat and any person 
with an indirect impact on the war effort, strongly implies that the dividing 
line between the general war effort and the conduct of hostilities is the addi-
tion to or support of military capacity versus some application of force or 
harm to the enemy. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020 
n.113. Keck gives several other examples of this fine line. For instance, he 
posits that transporting ammunition on a truck meets causation if it is des-
tined directly for a unit at the front line, but transporting it to a port for fur-
ther shipment would not meet the required level of causation. Keck, supra 
note 17, at 142. 
 101. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020 
 102. The ICRC notes a difference between the general war effort and war 
sustaining activities. The general war effort includes activities directly sup-
porting the general military effort, such as production, design, and transport. 
War sustaining activities are further removed and include activities associat-
ed with a nation at war such as political propaganda, finance, and mainte-
nance of an economy geared to support the war effort. Id. 
 103. This test, however, stipulates that participation in the general war 
effort will always be considered indirect participation in hostilities. Id. at 
1019–20. 
 104. This act does not need to be indispensable to the harm, as direct partic-
ipation could occur when a person provides extra help that is not strictly 
needed to accomplish the goal. Schmitt further notes that the single step 
could not have been literal, as gathering intelligence is several steps removed 
from an attack, but still certainly direct participation. Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 725, 727–28. 
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and storing an Improvised Explosive Device would be at least a 
single causal step removed from the military harm incurred 
when that weapon is employed by placing and detonating it.105 
The direct causation element contains an exception for coordi-
nated operations where the operation itself meets the causation 
element.106 This exception will find direct causation if the indi-
vidual act is both an integral part of the operation and under-
taken specifically for that operation.107 
The third requirement of the Protocol I Test is a belligerent 
nexus.108 A belligerent nexus exists when the act in question 
was “specifically designed [to cause the required threshold of 
military harm] to support a belligerent party to the detriment 
of another” party.109 A belligerent nexus differs from traditional 
subjective intent, in that a belligerent nexus requires only an 
evaluation of the purpose of the act itself, whereas a subjective 
evaluation would focus on what the individual actually intend-
ed to accomplish through the act.110 Belligerent nexus is evalu-
ated by inferring the purpose of the act from available objective 
facts in each circumstance, and therefore imputes intent to all 
participants in such an act regardless of their individual in-
tent.111 For instance, a civilian that attacks a soldier to prevent 
                                                                                                                                     
 105. There is great disagreement about whether a civilian should be tar-
getable when engaging in such an activity. Many military commanders be-
lieve that, although it would fail the Protocol I Test, the act is inherently hos-
tile and is likely the only practical time to interdict the Improvised Explosive 
Device. See id. at 725, 729. 
 106. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1022. 
 107. Actions like general military training, though integral to a certain op-
eration, are not specific enough to a certain operation to amount to direct 
participation. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 
26, at 729–30. Moreover, the examples given by the ICRC and its specific 
language, such as indicating the location of forces, imply that collective mili-
tary operations are limited to those achieving a specific and limited objective, 
instead of broader strategic operations. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra 
note 19, at 1023. 
 108. Watkin, supra note 87, at 657–58. 
 109. Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity, supra note 59, 
at 857, 873. 
 110. A finding of belligerent nexus requires the intent to cause the thresh-
old of harm referenced in the first element of Protocol I Test. INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1026–27. 
 111. Similar acts may have different motivations, such as inflicting military 
harm on an enemy, enjoying criminal gain, or simply defending one’s self. 
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 735–36. 
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a rape would lack a belligerent nexus because the act would not 
be designed to cause military harm, even though military harm 
was caused through a purposeful act, regardless of the true in-
tentions of the civilian.112 Conversely, a civilian would have a 
belligerent nexus if he or she spontaneously joined a military 
attack with the sole intention of looting the other side for prof-
it.113 An individual would be excused from an act with a bellig-
erent nexus only if he was unaware of his participation in the 
act, such as a person unaware that they were transporting a 
bomb.114 
C. Functionality Test 
The Functionality Test was predominantly developed by the 
United States to interpret the idea of direct participation in 
hostilities in a manner that acknowledged the military value of 
civilians on the battlefield.115 The Functionality Test evaluates 
the importance and level of support of a civilian’s military func-
tion to the achievement of a party’s military goals.116 This test 
does not focus on the actual or potential harm caused to the 
other side, but instead focuses on the value provided to the 
armed forces by the civilian’s activities.117 Under the Function-
ality Test, the more essential a civilian is to victory on the bat-
                                                                                                                                     
  112. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1027–28. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Keck, supra note 17, at 143. 
 115. The Parks Memorandum is a United States Army Judge Advocate 
General memorandum that is credited with introducing the ideas of the 
Functionality Test. The Parks Memorandum originally detailed the Func-
tionality Test’s criteria to determine a civilian’s protection status when at-
tached to an army. This document is geared towards evaluating the classifi-
cation of civilians that accompany United States forces in overseas, interstate 
conflicts, and, therefore, must be adapted to an intrastate conflict which may 
feature less organized belligerent parties. See Moore, supra note 18, at 21 
(citing Memorandum of Law, W. Hays Parks, Office of The Judge Advocate 
General, U.S. Army, Law of War Status of Civilians Accompanying Military 
Forces in the Field (May 6, 1999) (on file with The Brooklyn Journal of Inter-
national Law) [hereinafter Law of War Memo]. 
 116. Id.; Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 
725–28. Adopting and expecting reciprocal treatment from the enemy can be 
said to underlie the International Law of War. As such, this test should apply 
to irregular militaries, including those in armed opposition during an intra-
state conflict. Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 365, 368 (2009). 
 117. Moore, supra note 18, at 21. 
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tlefield, the more likely they are to have crossed the threshold 
for direct participation.118 Furthermore, under this test, direct 
participation can be dependent on the particular strategy a 
side chooses because the strategy determines the importance of 
specific functions to military success.119 The Functionality Test, 
therefore, is dependent on the circumstances of the individual 
civilian, as well as his or her role in the overall war strategy.120 
This test is attractive because it accounts for the fact that civil-
ians can augment and perform functions that are not just in-
dispensable, but constitute the heart of military operations, 
even in modern armies.121 
The Functionality Test also requires that the hostile activity 
be in “direct support of combat operations.”122 Direct support is 
determined by examining the alignment of goals and the inte-
gration of civilian and military activity.123 The definition of di-
rect support is amorphous, but it seeks to include civilian activ-
ities that support soldiers in battle or a civilian’s action “in the 
midst of an ongoing engagement.”124 
                                                                                                                                     
 118. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 906–07. 
 119. Stigall notes that, during the United States campaign in Afghanistan, 
the strategy selected will affect how vital a civilian is considered under the 
Functionality Test. The use of American civilians to build and repair infra-
structure in Afghanistan may constitute direct participation under the Func-
tionality Test, since such activity is viewed by the U.S. military as integral to 
the overall military strategy. If the reconstruction, however, was undertaken 
for purely humanitarian reasons concurrent with the war, American civilians 
participating in such an effort would not directly participate in hostile acts 
under the Functionality Test due to their unimportance to the military strat-
egy. Id. 
 120. Keck, supra note 17, at 145. 
 121. Moore, supra note 18, at 21; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO/NSAID-00-115, DEFENSE LOGISTICS: AIR FORCE REPORT ON CONTRACTOR 
SUPPORT IS NARROWLY FOCUSED 1-9, 13, 16 (2000), available at 
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA377822. 
 122. This standard is intended to provide some protection from civilians 
engaged in what is traditionally understood as the general war effort. It 
seems to place a heavy focus on the geographical disposition of the civilian, 
whereas the Protocol I Test seems to acknowledge that these categories are 
driven more by the function of the civilian. See Moore, supra note 18, at 21. 
 123. Moore, supra note 18, at 24. 
 124. Id. At 21 n. 224 (quoting ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 484 n.14 (A.R. Thomas & 
James C. Duncan eds., Supp. 1999). Moore implies that the idea of direct 
support is related to the idea of activities in the general war effort through 
examples, though he notes that guidance is not clear. See id. at 21 n.224. 
2014] CIVILIAN SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVISTS 1227 
The Functionality Test also requires that the perception of 
the enemy must be considered in order to determine how criti-
cal they believe the civilian is to the opposing side.125 The same 
criteria used in the main Functionality Test should be evaluat-
ed from the point of view of the opposing party.126 This consid-
eration provides some balance to the subjective and arbitrary 
nature of the Functionality Test by considering the view of both 
sides to a conflict.127 
III. APPLICATION OF THE PROTOCOL I AND FUNCTIONALITY 
TESTS TO THE ARAB SPRING 
The different uses of social media during the Arab Spring 
would result in different protections for civilians depending on 
which test is used.128 The choice of applying either the Protocol 
I Test or the Functionality Test can be dispositive in determin-
ing whether international law is able to best balance protec-
                                                                                                                                     
Moore also writes that the Functionality Test does “not condone targeting 
civilians for general participation in the war effort, similar to Protocol I” but 
allows targeting of those rendering direct support. This seems to adopt direct 
support as an element of the test, and explain its relation to the general war 
effort. See id. at 21. The definitions of direct support that Moore cites are not 
entirely congruent with the general war effort as understood by the ICRC in 
the Protocol I Test. Compare id. at 21 n.224, with INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, 
supra note 19, at 1020. 
 125. Moore, supra note 18, at 21. 
 126. This element should inject predictability into the test, as putting one’s 
self in the shoes of the enemy should lead to more uniformity between what 
each party believes is protected. See Law of War Memo, supra note 115, §3. 
 127. See id. §3. 
 128. Stigall notes that the choice of framework, when coupled with the facts 
of the situation, will be dispositive in determining if direct participation in 
the hostilities occurred. Stigall, supra note 22, at 898. It is unlikely, but pos-
sible, that social media activists would be considered combatants in an intra-
state conflict if they could be found to be under a responsible command of a 
recognized party to the conflict and under that party’s system of discipline. 
This would only be found when the social media activist was integrated into a 
quasi-military command structure and subject to its directions. See Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 
11, art 43; Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 4: Definition of Armed Forces, 
supra 68; JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, at II-1. It is important to note, however, 
that the increase in focus on Information Operations and Psychological Oper-
ations among established militaries reinforces the idea that dissemination of 
information can be a military activity, especially when used as a supporting 
effort in a military operation. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note 24, at 1–7. 
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tions of legitimate social media activity with a regime’s right to 
self-defense in an internal conflict.129 
A. Use of Social Media to Organize Protests that Threaten the 
Regime. 
In a situation where social media is used to organize and in-
cite protests against a regime, as it was in Tunisia,130 neither 
test would likely result in a finding of direct participation in 
hostilities.131 Under the Protocol I Test, no threshold of harm 
would be found, as the harm would not be of a “specifically mil-
itary nature,”132 because any harm would be political.133 Causa-
tion likewise would not be found, as such a finding is directly 
contingent upon a finding that the threshold of harm had been 
met.134 Even if it were stipulated that the threshold of harm 
had been met, causation would also fail, as providing the in-
formation to incite a protest would be several steps removed 
from any specific military harm inflicted by the actual protes-
tors.135 A belligerent nexus would also be lacking in this situa-
tion because a political protest is difficult to characterize as ex-
hibiting an objective intent to cause the threshold of harm re-
quired by the first element of the test.136 In examining the ac-
tions of a social media activist organizing a protest, it would be 
difficult to conclude that the activist’s actions were designed 
with the purpose of causing the requisite military harm.137 
                                                                                                                                     
 129. Stigall, supra note 22, at 898; See International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, supra note 10, art. 19; See Joseph, supra note 15. 
 130. Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’s role in Arab Spring (Middle East 
Uprisings), supra note 2. 
 131. See generally Kamus & Vaughn, supra note 71. The use of social media 
to incite political protests is analogous to events that took place during the 
Tunisian revolution. See Ryan, supra note 3. 
 132. Threshold of harm is more arguable in Tunisia where protests pres-
sured the regime to give up political power. Although the army was called, 
but failed, to respond to requests for aid to the Tunisian regime―possibly due 
to social media pressure―there was still no armed military conflict to be al-
tered in that scenario. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1016. 
 133. Here, the harm was to pressure the regime to cede power in a political 
sense. See Ryan, supra note 3. 
 134. See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 
719–20; See Watkin, supra note 87, at 658. 
 135. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1021. 
 136. Id. at 1021. 
 137. Jamie Williamson, Challenges of Twenty-First Century Conflict, 20 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 457, 466 (2010). 
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The Functionality Test also would fail to find direct partici-
pation in this scenario. Evaluating the status and importance 
of a social media activist’s effect on the military would be moot 
when his or her activities do not contribute to any military 
goals.138 Though the Functionality Test is more liberal than the 
Protocol I Test, it is still based on a civilian’s importance to the 
achievement of military goals.139 
B. Use of Social Media to Incite Protests that Aid Military Ac-
tion. 
Protests, informed and organized by social media, could be 
used to distract or hamper regime forces in order to allow an 
opposition attack.140 A protest could be deliberately organized, 
or opportunistically exploited, by an insurgency to distract or 
misdirect military forces during an armed attack.141 
Under any of these circumstances, the Protocol I Test could 
be used to find the threshold of harm because the protests di-
vert military resources away from fighting in the concurrent 
armed conflict.142 The military harm caused by distracting sol-
diers is not diminished by the possibility that protected politi-
cal or other nonmilitary harm may result from the protest.143 
Military harm under this test must be specific, but not exclu-
sive, as implied by the ICRC’s finding that interrupting the 
                                                                                                                                     
 138. Moore examines a journalist who only begins to be considered under 
the Functionality Test when the goals of the journalist and military align. See 
Moore, supra note 18, at 21. 
 139. Id. at 24–26. 
 140. Although not an attack on a regime by an insurgency, the Benghazi 
attack on the U.S. Consulate illustrates the plausible tactic of using a protest 
as a distraction for a military assault. The genesis of the Benghazi Protests 
that accompanied the simultaneous attack on the U. S. Consulate is not en-
tirely clear. It is likely the protest was planned in response to an offensive 
video, without knowledge of the impending attack; however, it is possible that 
the protest was a planned distraction. See Scott Shane, Clearing the Record 
on Benghazi, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2012, at A16; More recent reports have 
shown that the relationship between the protest and attack may be even less 
clear upon further investigation. David Kirkpatrick, A Deadly Mix in Ben-
ghazi, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0. 
 141. See Shane, supra note 140. 
 142. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1018–19. 
 143. Again, it is not clear what the motivation of the Benghazi protestors 
was. Their goals may have been expressive or possibly even military. Scott 
Shane, supra note 140; David Kirkpatrick, supra note 140. 
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food supply could meet the threshold of harm, even though it 
may disproportionately affect the civilian population.144 
Even if the broad military threshold of harm element is met, 
causation is extremely difficult to show. Here the military 
harm is distracting the soldiers, which is directly caused by the 
participants in the protest.145 Therefore, the social media activ-
ist’s action of inciting the protest would be at least one causal 
step removed from the protestors’ distraction.146 Furthermore, 
the ICRC guidance states that political propaganda is neces-
sarily indirect participation, as it is part of the general war ef-
fort.147 
Inciting, or even organizing, a protest to support an attack 
could be considered an integral part of a collective military op-
eration, and thus fall within the coordinated operations excep-
tion to the causation requirement.148 Such an argument would 
misconstrue the purpose of the collective operations exception, 
which is to ensure that causation is not excused simply because 
some participants in a military operation do not independently 
cause harm, but still help a collective unit inflict the required 
threshold of harm.149 It would be an abuse of the causation ex-
                                                                                                                                     
 144. Examples like interrupting food supply are stated not to meet the 
threshold of harm unless they impair military operations or capacity. This 
suggests that “specific” military harm does not equate with “exclusive” mili-
tary harm, as the residual harm of that action could be to hurt government or 
civilian operations. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1019. 
 145. See Keck, supra note 17, at 142. 
 146. Unlike Schmitt’s example of gathering intelligence, which could possi-
bly be characterized as a single causal act with multiple steps, acts to incite a 
protest are inherently indirect as they rely on the independent actions of dis-
creet individuals instead of integrated collective actions to complete the hos-
tile act. See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, 
at 725, 727–28. 
 147. It may be possible to distinguish this situation from what the ICRC 
thought of as political propaganda if it was done with the purpose of causing 
specific military consequences, like diverting military forces. See 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020. 
 148. Id. at 1022–23. 
 149. This exception seeks to acknowledge that a modern military operation 
includes many people who do not directly cause harm to the enemy. For in-
stance a Forward Air Controller may not drop a bomb but may be necessary 
to properly target the bomb. Andrew Walton, The History of the Airborne 
Forward Air Controller in Vietnam, 2–3 (2004) (unpublished thesis for Mas-
ters of Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col-
lege), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA429021; 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1022–23. 
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ception to consider an operation to be collective, when partici-
pants may not be aware that they are even participants in a 
collective action. Thus, a social media activist who incites or 
even organizes a protest is not part of a collective action with 
the protestors and the collective operations exception is not ap-
plicable.150 
A belligerent nexus could only be found, upon objective in-
spection of the facts, if the protest was designed specifically 
with the intent to divert military resources away from an 
armed conflict.151 In a situation where a protest was organized 
in order to cause military harm, but the participants attended 
to express political discontent, the Functionality Test does not 
provide clear guidance.152 The ICRC states that civilians ob-
structing military activity while fleeing violence lack a bellig-
erent nexus, while those blocking a road in order to obstruct 
military operations exhibit a belligerent nexus.153 It is likely 
that, in an unclear situation, the objective facts would be con-
strued cautiously in order to ascribe the intent of the majority 
of participants to the act as a whole.154 The outcome, however, 
is far from clear. 
It is important to note that a finding of belligerent nexus is a 
description of the objective purpose of the act, not of any indi-
vidual, and that such a finding would impute a belligerent 
nexus onto the organizers and all participants in the protest.155 
The Protocol I Test declines to find a belligerent nexus in ex-
treme situations where a civilian is unaware of his or her part 
                                                                                                                                     
 150. This seems most analogous to the example of the training of military 
recruits being considered indirect causation because the training was re-
moved from the specific hostile action by intervening decisions, similar to the 
way that protests are dependent on the individual decisions of the protestors. 
See Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 725, 
729–39. 
 151. See Watkin, supra note 87, at 659. 
 152. The requirement is that the act be “specifically designed to cause the 
required threshold of harm.” This does not mention that intent needs to be 
exclusive. It is likely that “specific” has the same meaning as it does for the 
threshold of harm. The report, however, does not explore examples of an act 
being designed for two purposes. Experts compiling this report note that, if 
specific intent is ambiguous, it cannot justify “split second targeting.” 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1022–27. 
 153. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1027–28. 
 154. Keeping the Balance Between Necessity and Humanity, supra note 59, 
at 874–77. 
 155. A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 34. 
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in hostilities, such as when a civilian drives a truck unaware 
that he or she is transporting munitions.156 A civilian taking 
part in a protest, without knowing that the protest is a pretext 
for a military assault, could be analogized to a civilian being 
unaware of his or her role in hostilities. That exception, howev-
er, is limited and seems inapplicable to situations where the 
civilian is aware of their actions, but not aware of the greater 
purpose of their actions.157 In such a case, the determination of 
belligerent nexus is likely moot because the organizing activist 
will retain civilian protection due to a lack of causation, as the 
organization of a protest is several causal steps removed from 
any military harm caused.158 
Subjecting this scenario to the Functionality Test will render 
a different outcome. Under the Functionality Test, the incite-
ment or facilitation of a protest which diverts or misdirects a 
regime’s military resources could be found sufficiently support-
ive of a military action to overthrow that regime to warrant the 
loss of the instigators’ civilian protections.159 This would re-
quire a finding that the protest had a serious impact on mili-
tary objectives, and that the social media activist was an im-
portant, high level catalyst in direct support of the protest.160 
The regime’s agents might also claim that they subjectively 
perceived the activist as a threat in order to reinforce the im-
portance of the action, if the activist is involved in a large 
demonstration.161 In such a scenario, because the activist as-
sisted in mobilizing a large amount of demonstrators, the im-
portance of his function would be quite high.162 Although this 
test is highly dependent on facts, it is also highly subjective 
and open to a great deal of interpretation,163 subject only to the 
                                                                                                                                     
 156. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1027. 
 157. See id. at 1027. 
 158. See Watkin, supra note 87, at 659. 
 159. Stigall suggests that military goals can also include winning the alle-
giance of the local population, which, while certainly a political goal, may also 
be considered a military goal. This is analogous to the use of civilians to re-
construct Afghan infrastructure, which possibly meets the Functionality Test 
due to that mission being critical to overall military goals. See Stigall, supra 
note 22, at 907. 
 160. See id. at 896–97. 
 161. For an in depth explanation of the subjective criteria used to apply the 
Functionality Test, see Moore, supra note 18, at 21. 
 162. See Keck, supra note 17, at 144–45. 
 163. Id. at 145. 
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civilian’s functional level of support and his or her importance 
to military goals.164 The Functionality Test does not limit itself 
to the military significance of actions, as the Protocol I Test 
does, but examines the civilian’s military role.165 The protestors 
would likely retain protection because they would not, individ-
ually, be important enough, or contribute enough functional 
support, to become military targets.166 
C. Use of Social Media to Incite Military Defections from the 
Regime. 
Civilian social media activists may also attempt to cause de-
fections from the regime’s military forces with the secondary 
goal of augmenting the ranks of armed opposition groups, as 
was the case in Syria.167 Under the Protocol I Test, defection 
would meet the threshold of harm as the regime’s military ca-
pacity would be directly diminished by the removal of its sol-
diers from battle.168 Mere recruitment of fighters for the opposi-
tion, on the other hand, would fail to meet the threshold of 
harm.169 This is due to the fact that the threshold of harm is 
not met when the opposition increases its own military capacity 
without independently causing military harm to the regime.170 
Causation is difficult to demonstrate, as enticing or convinc-
ing a soldier to defect is, at least, a causal step removed from 
the hostile act, especially because the defecting soldier’s action 
is a choice independent from the enticement of the activist.171 
Even if defection could be characterized as a collective action, 
                                                                                                                                     
 164. Moore, supra note 18, at 21. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Law of War Memo, supra note 115, §3. 
 167. In this story, it should be noted that documented attempts to encour-
age defection where undertaken by combatants of the armed opposition, not 
by sympathetic civilian efforts. Solomon & Hamilton, supra note 7. The Syri-
an opposition has also attempted to encourage defections through YouTube, 
though by a member of the Free Syrian Army and not an unaffiliated civilian. 
See Saad, supra note73. 
 168. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 
714–15. The threat of defection alone can have significant military conse-
quences, such as grounding the air force for fear of losing planes to the oppos-
ing force. See Rod Nordland, Latest Syrian Defectors are from Higher Ranks, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at A9. 
 169. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1018–19. 
 170. A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 27–28. 
 171. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020. 
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enticement would not form an integral part of that action,172 as 
defection is possible without such enticement. The normal cau-
sation element, as well as the collective operations exception, 
could possibly be met if the social media activist and opposition 
materially facilitated defection by providing safe passage or 
some similar aid. 
Belligerent nexus is entirely dependent on the existence of 
facts indicating that the defection campaign was objectively 
designed to harm the regime’s military, rather than build the 
combat power of the armed opposition.173 This is because a bel-
ligerent nexus refers to the objective design of an act to achieve 
a valid threshold of harm.174 A social media activist inciting de-
fections would likely fail the Protocol I Test due to negative 
findings of causation and belligerent nexus because the harm-
ful action was causally remote and not conclusively designed 
with the purpose to harm the regime’s military. 
The Functionality Test would find the inducement of defec-
tions to be direct participation in a conflict, especially if the de-
fectors joined the ranks of the opposition.175 The function of 
causing defection and recruiting soldiers would seem to be of 
the highest order in an internal conflict.176 This point is even 
more pronounced as the Functionality Test does not require 
that causation be limited to a single causal step like the Proto-
col I Test.177 Under the Functionality Test, the requisite level of 
importance of a social media activist needs to be determined 
based upon a factual examination of how instrumental the ac-
                                                                                                                                     
 172. See A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 29–31. 
 173. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 
736. 
 174. The elements of this test are cumulative; therefore, the succeeding 
elements must refer to a valid preceding fact. If both a valid and an invalid 
threshold of harm are found, but belligerent nexus is met for only the invalid 
threshold of harm, direct participation will not be found. A Critical Analysis, 
supra note 98, at 27. 
 175. Moore, supra note 18, at 21. 
 176. Recruiting fighters and drawing them from the enemy seems to be a 
more vital function than civilian reconstruction was in the Afghanistan con-
flict discussed by Stigall. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 906–07. 
 177. The Protocol I Test requires causation within a single step while the 
Functionality Test only requires the act be in direct support of operations. 
Compare INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020, with Moore, supra 
note 18, at 21. 
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tivist was in facilitating defections.178 A finding on the military 
importance must also consider the opposing regime’s evalua-
tion of a social media activist’s importance.179 A regime’s evalu-
ation would likely attach equal or greater importance than the 
opposition’s evaluation, to regime soldiers defecting and joining 
the ranks of the opposition. It is also important to note that a 
social media activist would lose protection under this test by 
either exclusively encouraging defections or exclusively recruit-
ing fighters, as both activities are important elements of the 
opposition’s military mission.180 Notably lacking is a require-
ment that the social media activist intend to affect the military 
balance of power by causing defections and aiding recruit-
ment.181 
D. Use of Social Media to Acquire Foreign Aid for the Opposi-
tion. 
Social media can also be used as a tool to document the abus-
es of the regime and the virtues of the opposition in the hope of 
obtaining outside aid for the struggle against the regime.182 
                                                                                                                                     
 178. The importance of social media as a tool of Psychological Operations to 
aid a military effort can be analogized to the importance of journalism as a 
Psychological Operations tool. Moore explores if a journalist embedded with a 
military unit would be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities. He 
notes that when the military exerts sufficient control over the journalist and 
the goals of the military and journalist align, then the journalists could pos-
sibly be targeted under the Functionality Test. See Moore, supra note 18, at 
24–26. 
 179. Law of War Memo, supra note 115, §3. 
 180. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 896. 
 181. Moore requires that independent journalists be brought under military 
control before they can pass the Functionality Test. This seems to be a special 
case, however, as the activity in which such journalists play a role is a mili-
tary controlled Information Operations campaign. Because this is described 
as a plan integrating many types of information and disseminating it accord-
ing to a mission specific plan, the goal could not logically be advanced without 
some instruction, coordination, or facilitation by the military. Other activities 
could possibly constitute direct participation under the Functionality Test 
without such close integration with military goals. For examples see Moore, 
supra note 18, at 21. 
 182. This website shows that the documentation of regime abuses may re-
sult in pressure for foreign governments to intervene or otherwise provide 
aid. Geoffrey Mock, Desperate Reprisals, Documenting the Syrian Regime’s 
Abuses, AMNESTY INT’L (June 20, 2012), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-
east/desperate-reprisals-documenting-the-syrian-regimes-abuses. 
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This aid may take the form of punitive action against the re-
gime,183 efforts to deny the regime military advantage,184 direct 
aid to the opposition,185 or even foreign military intervention 
against the regime.186 Regardless of the aid secured by the 
pressure created by social media activists, securing interna-
tional aid could never be considered direct participation under 
the Protocol I Test, although some elements of the test may be 
satisfied. The threshold of harm would be met by some of these 
forms of aid if they either adversely affect the regime’s military 
capacity by denying them weapons and support or if they result 
in the infliction of military damage by, for example, encourag-
ing a foreign government to attack the regime.187 A social me-
dia activist who attracts international aid that results in the 
arming or training of the opposition would fail to cause military 
damage consistent with the threshold of harm, due to the fact 
that building the opposition’s military capacity fails to inflict 
sufficient military harm on the regime.188 There is, however, a 
possibility that coercive economic sanctions could cause suffi-
cient military harm to meet the threshold of harm, if military 
capacity is sufficiently damaged.189 
Causation will not be found when a social media activist gar-
ners international support to aid the opposition or harm the 
                                                                                                                                     
 183. E.U. Expands Sanctions, Moves Toward Oil Embargo, REUTERS (Aug. 
19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/syria-eu-sanctions-
idUSB5E7IL02720110819. 
 184. Foreign supplies of weapons were intercepted en route to the Syrian 
regime. Richard Spencer et. al., Britain Stops Russian Ship Carrying Attack 
Helicopters for Syria, TELEGRAPH, June 19, 2012. 
 185. Weapons can be used to arm the opposition as they were in Libya. Rod 
Nordland, Libyan Rebels Say They’re Being Sent Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 2011, at A10. 
 186. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided international air 
support to the Libyan opposition. Richard Spencer, Libya: Coalition Forces 





 187. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 
715–20. 
 188. A Critical Analysis, supra note 98, at 27. 
 189. It seems possible to interpret the Protocol I Test to find military harm 
through economic sanctions that diminish military forces. See INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 995–96. 
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regime because such action is part of the general war effort and 
more than a single causal step removed from the harm. First, 
because the aid is supplied by another power with independent 
volition, the provision of aid will necessarily be more than a 
single causal step removed from any action by the social media 
activist that may have caused it. The social media activist must 
raise international awareness, the populace of the nation ren-
dering aid must then exert pressure, the government of that 
nation must decide to render such aid, and then the aid must 
be delivered. Second, the social media activist’s attempt to ac-
quire such international aid will be considered a part of the 
general war effort because it is a high level, civilian govern-
ment, wartime operation, similar to diplomacy or the purchase 
of necessary military supplies.190 Furthermore, such aid is not 
geared toward a specific operation, but to generally degrading 
the regime’s military capacity or increasing the opposition’s 
military capacity.191 
Even if causation were found, a belligerent nexus is unlikely 
to be found, as the social media activist’s campaign was likely 
intended to induce the international community to inflict polit-
ical, rather than military, harm.192 Belligerent nexus is espe-
cially problematic for economic sanctions, as it is probable, 
again, that the enacting state pursued them in order to force 
the regime to make political concessions rather than inflict mil-
itary harm.193 It is difficult to ascribe a specific purpose to a 
social media activist’s campaign to bring international atten-
tion to a conflict. It is more logical to assume that the activists 
are attempting to secure whatever type of aid they can, not 
specific aid for a single military operation. 
In contrast, the Functionality Test is more amenable to find-
ing direct participation for instances of social activism which 
                                                                                                                                     
 190. For examples of the application of the causation element of the Proto-
col I Test see id. at 1020. 
 191. Only in cases where an allied attack is coordinated with the opposition 
could causation be direct, otherwise the opposition is simply helping to create 
a broad political action through the participation of the ally. It is unlikely, 
however, that the social media activist’s pressure would exhibit enough direct 
connection to have caused such a specific attack. See id. at 1021–23. 
 192. See Keck, supra note 17, at 143. 
 193. Here some sanctions were targeted at specific members of the regime, 
presumably to influence their decision making. E.U. Expands Sanctions, 
Moves Toward Oil Embargo, supra note 183. 
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result in international aid for the opposition.194 Securing the 
aid of a major international power could prove decisive in alter-
ing the military balance in a conflict.195 The Functionality Test, 
however, does require that an action be taken in “direct sup-
port” of combat operations.196 Because seeking international 
aid is not directly aligned and integrated with the opposition’s 
military goals, but instead aimed at broader political goals, the 
Functionality Test would also fail to find direct participation in 
hostilities due to a lack of direct support.197 
IV. EVALUATION OF CURRENT INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES AND 
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS. 
The use of either the Protocol I Test or the Functionality Test 
to determine when a civilian has lost protection through partic-
ipation in hostilities does not adequately address the balance 
between the social media activist’s right to free expression198 
and a regime’s right to defend itself against a legitimate, inter-
nal military threat.199 Both tests function satisfactorily at the 
extremes―prohibiting the military targeting of a political pro-
test organizer or a social media activist who can help secure 
                                                                                                                                     
 194. Stigall notes that the Functionality Test is more expansive than the 
Protocol I Test. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 896–97. 
 195. Securing the aid of a powerful ally, like the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization, seems to have been decisive to the outcome of the conflict in Lib-
ya. Interview by Bettina Klein of Deutschlandfunk radio with Egon Ramms, 
Retired General, Federal Republic of Germany (Aug. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.dw.de/nato-has-played-a-decisive-role-in-libya/a-15346089. Such 
aid, however, pales in comparison even to a civilian who maintains a vital 
weapons system. See Moore, supra note 18, at 21. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that influencing a civilian population can meet the Functionality 
Test as being a critical function for victory, like influencing the Afghan popu-
lation with reconstruction projects. Securing international aid seems no fur-
ther removed from battlefield functions than influencing a domestic popula-
tion to facilitate traditional military operations. See Stigall, supra note 22, at 
906–07. 
 196. Moore, supra note 18, at 21. 
 197. For an example of the consideration of direct support in the case of 
embedded journalists under the Functionality Test, see id. at 24–26. 
 198. International law protects rights of expression. International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 10, art. 19. 
 199. Joseph, supra note 15. 
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general foreign aid.200 The Protocol I Test may fail to allow a 
regime to defend itself when a social media activist is instru-
mental in encouraging defections or when that activist organiz-
es a protest specifically for military advantage. The Protocol I 
Test is generally too restrictive to accommodate targeting of 
civilians that in some circumstances are performing important 
and indispensable military functions that are too diffuse to 
form a particular instance of specific military harm but which 
may still be distinguished from the general war effort.201 On 
the other hand, the Functionality Test has been criticized as 
too malleable and arbitrary, conditioning direct participation 
upon the subjective importance of a civilian’s role in a strategy 
that may not be widely known.202 The Functionality Test also 
fails to give adequate weight to the civilian’s individual intent, 
which could lead to loss of protection for a social media activist 
that unwittingly causes important military harm, such as or-
ganizing a protest that distracts regime soldiers, leading to an 
opposition attack.203 The Functionality Test has further been 
criticized for failing to provide a predictable, bright line where 
direct participation ends and where indirect participation, like 
financing, which is too far removed from hostilities under the 
Functionality Test, begins.204 
                                                                                                                                     
 200. Social media could be one of the means used to create public pressure 
on foreign governments to intervene in an intrastate conflict, implicating mil-
itary consequences. See the Colonel Charges Ahead, supra note 82. 
 201. See Keck, supra note 17, at 145 (citing Deconstructing Direct Participa-
tion in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 737–38). The social media activist’s po-
tential analogue, depending on exact activity, in an organized military is that 
of an Information Operations or Psychological Operations specialist. It is like-
ly that such activities could be traced to a specific military harm, as their 
effects may be diffuse and cumulative. They are, however, employed on the 
“tactical” level, meaning that they are targeted more specifically than just 
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A. Evaluation of the Protocol I Test 
The Protocol I Test does not allow for the loss of protection 
when a civilian traceably, but not directly, causes a specific in-
stance of military harm under the “no more than one causal 
step” standard.205 This is a helpful distinction in separating 
true participation in hostilities from the general war effort.206 
The distinction does not, however, allow for the fact that some 
actions may not be direct, but still cause specific and traceable 
harm, with the intent to cause diffuse military harm, in sup-
port of broad, rather than specific, military goals. For instance, 
Psychological Operations are employed by modern armies to 
degrade an enemy force’s morale and will to fight, not just 
those defending specific objectives,207 whereas participation in 
the general war effort involves activities like the production of 
ammunition for general use.208 While ammunition could trace-
ably be used to achieve a specific objective, it is inherently 
building a general military capacity to be employed as needed 
in later operations.209 Organizing civilian perceptions through 
social media could be considered part of a general war effort, 
like producing ammunition to build general military capacity, 
or it could be considered an actual application of military ca-
pacity against the regime, albeit in a general, rather than spe-
cific, manner.210 Actions that could be analogized to a tactical 
military application should, however, be considered direct par-
ticipation as they are no longer a part of the “general war ef-
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 205. See Watkin, supra note 87, at 658. 
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Psychological Operations against civilian and military audiences to achieve 
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tives. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note 24, at 1–2 to 1–4. 
 208. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1020. 
 209. Schmitt explains that employing capacity and, in some cases like con-
structing an Improvised Explosive Device, building capacity, should meet the 
direct causation standard to allow a military to defend itself from such activi-
ties. Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 26, at 727. 
 210. The ICRC does use production of propaganda as an example of an ac-
tivity within the general war effort. The ICRC also notes, however, that 
propagandists can lose their protection if they directly participate in hostili-
ties. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 1019–22. 
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fort,”211 whether a social media activist’s efforts caused diffuse 
military harm or harm to a specific target. Shaping public opin-
ion to support a general, albeit tactical, military end is an ac-
cepted application of Psychological Operations or Information 
Operations.212 Giving blanket protection to civilians who take 
part in such activities creates a double standard, as a regime 
that retains similar Information Operations and Psychological 
Operations capabilities in its military would remain subject to 
targeting by the opposition while a civilian engaging in such 
activities could intentionally cause military harm without be-
ing targeted.213 The Protocol I Test would, however, extend ci-
vilian protection to Information Operations and Psychological 
Operations activities by social media activists since they are at 
least one step removed and arguably part of the general war 
effort.214 
The Protocol I Test’s strict direct causation requirement has 
also been criticized more broadly because it fails to include ci-
vilians that make deadly and effective contributions to a con-
flict.215 Michael Schmitt criticizes the Protocol I Test because 
                                                                                                                                     
 211. Although not targeting a specific military objective, the use of social 
media to cause a direct harm is more analogous to a tactical operation than 
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171 (Spring 2011). 
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objective. See Moore, supra note 18, at 12; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note 24, 
at 1-1 to 1-4. 
 213. If the Protocol I Test is applied and found to exclude civilian Infor-
mation Operations from direct participation in hostilities, members of the 
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armed forces. International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 4: Definition of 
Armed Forces, supra note 68; See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 19, at 
1020. 
 214. Keck references the conservative approach that grants greater immun-
ity to those more closely associated with the general war effort and in general 
seeks to minimize findings of direct participation in hostilities. Keck, supra 
note 17, at 131. 
 215. Schmitt writes that constructing an improvised explosive device or a 
bomb vest for a suicide bomber would be examples excluded under the Proto-
col I Test’s approach to causation, but are still integral to causing the requi-
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activities, like building an Improvised Explosive Device, are 
excluded because they are more than one causal step removed 
from harm, while military commanders implicitly feel that such 
bomb makers must be targeted, as targeting them is the most 
effective way to interdict such weapons.216 Similarly, a social 
media activist can only cause indirect harm, that is, harm more 
than one causal step removed, because they merely enable, or 
indirectly cause, such harm through the physical actions of 
others, such as protestors or defectors.217 
Furthermore, the Protocol I Test characterizes the activity in 
question based on the objective purpose of its design, and can 
impute a belligerent nexus to all participants without consider-
ing individual intent.218 This ascribes a belligerent nexus to all 
participants in either spreading the message of the activist or 
participating in a subsequent protest, provided that a belliger-
ent nexus is found for the overall purpose of the activity and 
the other elements of the test are met.219 Individual partici-
pants are excused from a collective finding of belligerent nexus 
only when they “are totally unaware of the role they are play-
ing in the conduct of hostilities” or the participants are de-
prived of freedom of action.220 This exception, however, is in-
tended to be extremely limited.221 To fall into this exception the 
protestor would have to be unaware that they were distracting 
soldiers at all; ignorance that the protestors were distracting 
soldiers to enable a military strike by the opposition would not 
be sufficient for this exception.222 This is consistent with the 
ICRC example, where the transportation of an explosive is only 
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 216. Id. at 725, 729. 
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excused if the driver does not know it is an explosive, but the 
same transportation presumably would not be excused if the 
driver were aware of the explosive, and only unaware of the 
purpose of the explosive.223 Based on this analysis, the Protocol 
I Test is not suitable to situations involving social media activ-
ists because damage to the regime is discounted as indirect and 
the belligerent nexus is imputed to all knowing participants no 
matter their individual subjective motivations.224 
B. Evaluation of the Functionality Test. 
The Functionality Test is generally better suited towards 
considering the rights of the regime, though at the expense of 
the important rights of civilians. The Functionality Test recog-
nizes that military damage which cannot be directly found 
within a single causal step to cause a specific instance of mili-
tary harm can still be traceably attributable to the civilian’s 
action.225 This connection is important because a social media 
activist could prove to be vital to military operations, and sup-
port those operations in a functionally significant way, if he 
were to incite a protest that tied up a large military force or if 
he were to cause military defections.226 Therefore the Function-
ality Test’s replacement of the Protocol I Test’s requirements 
for threshold of harm and causation with an evaluation of the 
value and gravity of the activity227 allows the regime greater 
flexibility to take action against new military capabilities with 
broad battlefield effects, such as the Information Operations of 
a social media activist, without tying such action to a single 
military objective.228 This would allow targeting of social media 
activists that cause significant military harm by encouraging 
defections. It would also address Michael Schmitt’s criticism of 
the Protocol I Test’s threshold of harm; the Protocol I Test fails 
to acknowledge that positively increasing the opposition’s mili-
                                                                                                                                     
 223. See id. at 1027. 
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tary capacity necessarily harms the regime by activities like 
securing fighters or arms through aid.229 
The Functionality Test still suffers from inherent arbitrari-
ness, as a social media activist can be targeted based on the 
subjective importance of his or her activity.230 This concern is 
partially addressed by the requirement that functionality and 
importance be assessed through the eyes of the regime as well 
as the perspective of the opposition.231 Adopting a standard 
that is too strict, however, to respond to the necessities of mod-
ern warfare will prove unworkable and ultimately be ignored 
as irrelevant.232 
The Functionality Test has some glaring shortcomings when 
applied to social media activism. First, the Functionality Test 
does not examine intent because it was originally developed to 
evaluate a civilian with a connection to an organized military. 
The test assumes that the civilian in question is providing a 
function with an obvious military goal, like repairing a valua-
ble weapon,233 or is providing a service under the control and 
direction of a military force towards a military goal, like a civil-
ian conducting an interrogation to gather military intelli-
gence.234 A civilian social media activist will not telegraph his 
or her intent so readily, based solely on an examination of the 
activity in question. Many participants in a protest organized 
through social media will act based on motivations that differ 
from the organizer’s original intent.235 These participants may 
even be ignorant of the “designed” purpose of the larger act.236 
Second, this test is too subjective to be predictable. A civilian 
may not know how militarily important the regime thinks the 
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 230. Keck, supra note 17, at 145. 
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civilian’s act is, and therefore will not have notice of whether 
he or she can be targeted based on his or her activities.237 
C. Suggested Improvements to the Functionality Test in the So-
cial Media Context. 
Because the Functionality Test better addresses the complex-
ities of social media activism in the context of the Arab Spring, 
its shortcomings must be addressed with additional safeguards. 
The Functionality Test should be augmented with a require-
ment that the activist not only demonstrate subjective intent to 
cause military harm, but also that his or her action not be a 
part of the general war effort, in that the action does more than 
merely build military capacity.238 
A measure of intent should be required to safeguard against 
the potential overreach of the Functionality Test.239 As the Pro-
tocol I Test’s idea of belligerent nexus fails to distinguish indi-
vidual motivations for action, 240 subjective intent to cause mili-
tary harm should be used in conjunction with the Functionality 
Test to ensure that each targeted civilian intends to cause mili-
tary harm in excess of protected political expression. This 
would ensure that a civilian will not lose protection just be-
cause his or her social media activities―or activities incited by 
social media―are incidentally and functionally important to a 
military operation.241 This will also allow each individual in-
volved in the act to be evaluated independently, in order to en-
sure that those not intending to cause military harm do not 
lose their civilian protections.242 
This standard may be difficult to administer during the chaos 
of civil unrest, but would not be any more prone to error or 
abuse than objectively divining the purpose of entire activities 
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under the belligerent nexus requirement.243 The ICRC recog-
nizes that a complex test to determine direct participation will 
be difficult to administer, and thus recommends the use of cau-
tion and a presumption of protection if a civilian’s status is un-
certain.244 Further in the context of social media activism, a 
regime will likely have more time to carefully consider target-
ing a civilian. This is because a social media activist will likely 
be removed in space and time from the military harm because 
they are acting remotely to influence the actions of others.245 
The subjective intent element should also consider whether 
any military harm caused by a social media activist at the ex-
pense of the regime is in support of another party.246 The con-
sideration of intent to support another party at the expense of 
the regime makes clear that the hostile act should be intended 
to support a group militarily opposing the regime. Inclusion of 
such a consideration of intent will help to ensure that civilians 
are not targeted for an act that only incidentally supports the 
opposition, while allowing civilians who truly wish to aid the 
opposition in their military struggle to be targeted. 
There is a need for further safeguards to confine the loss of 
civilian protections to cases where civilian actions are truly act-
ing in support of a military objective. These safeguards can 
protect a social media activist who is not providing true mili-
tary aid by ensuring his or her undertaking is not within the 
general war effort.247 The Functionality Test does require that 
an action be in direct support of military operations, however, 
that is not a standard suited to a diffuse intrastate conflict 
where a social media activist’s efforts may not be integrated 
with the opposition forces’ activities as required by this ele-
ment.248 
Although the Protocol I Test’s requirement for direct causa-
tion within a single causal step may be too confining for mod-
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ern warfare, its exclusion of activities supporting the general 
war effort is useful in preserving the notion that some civilians 
can generally support a country or faction at war without broad 
swaths of a state’s civilian population losing their protections 
from military targeting.249 Certain efforts mentioned by the 
ICRC, like designing weapons, producing weapons, or main-
taining transportation infrastructure, fit the traditional defini-
tion of the general war effort.250 The general war effort re-
striction should be slightly refined to encompass the building of 
general military capacity, but exclude employing that capacity 
in either a general or specific sense.251 Activities truly contrib-
uting to the general war effort deserve protection, but other 
activities, though not necessarily specific military actions, may 
result in specific military consequences, and therefore, should 
result in lost protection even if causation is removed by several 
steps, as in the case of an activist who generally causes mili-
tary defections.252 This standard should adopt the Protocol I 
Test’s exclusion of activities within the general war effort, in-
stead of the Functionality Test’s wider definition of direct sup-
port. Adoption of the refined restriction on activities within the 
general war effort would help ameliorate the dangers of over-
reach inherent to the Functionality Test.253 Moreover, this 
standard would help to further distinguish the use of social 
media to build general public support for a revolt from a more 
particular use of social media to militarily affect the regime or 
to achieve a particular military objective. 
CONCLUSION 
The widespread use of social media during the Arab Spring 
represents the confluence of several developments in conflict. 
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Primarily, the Arab Spring illustrates an increase in intrastate 
conflicts, 254 a proliferation of the use of social media in military 
and political conflicts, 255 and an amplified importance of In-
formation Operations in military conflict256 against the global 
trend of increasing civilianization of warfare.257 These trends 
create an environment where the traditional laws of war, and 
their requisite protection of civilians, are increasingly outmod-
ed.258 The use of social media in such internal conflicts strains 
the current understanding of civilian protection and has the 
potential to be used much like other weapons on the battle-
field.259 Yet, because social media can also be used for protected 
activities like political expression, careful evaluation is re-
quired before civilian protection can be stripped from social 
media activists.260 
The protection of civilians from targeting, except civilians 
who take “direct part in hostilities,” is an essential cornerstone 
of international law.261 Current interpretations do not, howev-
er, strike an acceptable balance between the concerns of a re-
gime that is defending itself and the social media activist who 
is exercising his recognized political rights.262 The Protocol I 
Test adheres to a time when civilians were often considered 
passive victims of warfare.263 As such, this test grants great 
protections to the social media activist without regard to the 
serious military impact they could have.264 The overly restric-
tive concepts of direct causation and belligerent nexus ensure 
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that it is almost impossible for a social media activist to lose 
civilian protection.265 The Functionality Test recognizes that 
civilians could become a legitimate target due to their im-
portance on the battlefield and their indispensable military 
functions.266 This test, however, lacks the necessary safeguards 
to provide predictability and adequate protections to civilians 
that do not intend to create a military advantage through their 
actions.267 The Functionality Test acknowledges the value of 
information activities in warfare and should be fortified with 
safeguards, to ensure that social media activists are only tar-
geted in the rare instances when they exhibit a subjective in-
tent to cause military harm that is separate from the general 
war effort.268 
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